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Zusammenfassung
Gesundheitsfachpersonen sind heutzutage sowohl aus rechtlicher 
als auch ethischer Sicht dazu verpflichtet, für jede medizinische 
Intervention die informierte Einwilligung ihrer Patienten einzuho-
len. Dementsprechend hat paternalistisches Vorgehen gegenüber 
Patienten in den meisten ethischen Richtlinien keinen Platz mehr. 
Was genau bedeutet aber informierte Einwilligung im Kontext der 
Psychotherapie? In Bezug auf die ethische Rechtfertigung von 
Psychotherapie könnte z.B. die Behauptung, dass Psychotherapie 
nichts anderes als Placebo sei, für die informierte Einwilligung 
zum Problem werden. Tatsächlich wurde seit der Entstehung der 
modernen Psychotherapie immer wieder kritisiert, sie sei Augen-
wischerei und ihre Wirkung gründe auf einem Placeboeffekt. Wir 
argumentieren, dass im gesamten Feld der Biomedizin nach wie 
vor konzeptuelle Unschärfen hinsichtlich der Begriffe «Placebo» 
und «Placeboeffekt» bestehen. Wir sind zudem überzeugt, dass 
der Begriff «Placebo» im Bereich der Psychotherapie mehr Fragen 
aufwirft als die Auseinandersetzung damit zu beantworten ver-
mag. Nichtsdestotrotz sind wir sicher, dass die moralisch geführte 
Kerndebatte über Placebo im klinischen Kontext wichtige Themen 
berührt, die in den psychotherapeutischen Kontext überführt wer-
den können, nämlich: Informieren Therapeuten ihre Patienten in 
adäquater Weise über die Wirkmechanismen von Psychotherapie? 
Legen sie die potenziellen Risiken unerwünschter Nebeneffekte 
offen? In Anbetracht der kontinuierlichen empirischen Psychothe-
rapieforschung folgern wir, dass Therapeuten ihren Patienten die 
allgemeinen Wirkfaktoren der Psychotherapie, die maßgeblich 
den Veränderungsprozessen während der Behandlung unterlie-
gen, nicht hinreichend transparent machen. Somit scheint uns, 
dass es in der psychotherapeutischen Praxis oft zu verstecktem 
und unangebrachtem Paternalismus kommt. Wir sind davon über-
zeugt, dass sich Paternalismus in der Psychotherapie auch beim 
Vorliegen guter Absichten nicht rechtfertigen lässt und dass eine 
adäquate Offenlegung der angenommenen Wirkfaktoren für den 
therapeutischen Prozess nützlich ist.
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Summary
From a legal as well as ethical point of view, healthcare profes-
sionals are nowadays obliged to obtain informed consent of pa-
tients. Consequently, paternalism is eschewed in most ethical 
codes of practice. But what should informed consent mean in 
psychotherapy? With respect to this question, the claim that psy-
chotherapy may be a placebo may raise grave concerns for its 
ethical practice. Indeed, almost since the inception of psychother-
apy some scholars have claimed that psychotherapy is a sham 
and/or it may work as a placebo. However, we argue that in clini-
cal biomedicine there is still much conceptual confusion about 
the terms ‘placebo’ and ‘placebo effect’; moreover, we contend 
that the term ‘placebo’, when applied to psychotherapy, may in-
vite more questions than it can easily resolve. Nonetheless, we 
assert that the core moral debate about clinical placebos raises 
important themes that are transferable to a psychotherapy con-
text: namely: are therapists providing adequate information to 
patients about how psychotherapy works, and are they communi-
cating potential risks of unwanted effects? In light of ongoing em-
pirical research into psychotherapy we argue that therapists may 
be failing to mention key features (so-called common factors) 
that are relevant to the process of therapeutic change. We assert 
that current psychotherapy practice appears to exhibit misplaced 
paternalism in failing to provide patients with this information. 
We conclude that any justification for paternalism on the grounds 
of beneficence is unfounded and that adequate disclosure poli-
cies are likely to enhance rather than undermine the therapeutic 
process.
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Introduction 
The history of medicine has – until the late 20th Century – been 
a history of paternalism toward patients. For most of medical his-
tory, physicians were considered absolute experts not only on the 
grounds of their medical training but also with respect to medical 
decision-making. Not merely the gatekeepers of medical knowl-
edge, physicians were viewed as doyens of how to best use medical 
knowledge as well as the best judges of whether (if ever) such 
knowledge should be imparted to patients. The medical profession, 
in turn, expected deference and compliance. Thus within medical 
practice, paternalism was implicitly justified with the adage ‘doctor 
knows best’ and the sentiment that a ‘good patient’ follows the 
‘doctor’s orders.’ It was not until the post-war period in the late 
1950s that medicine became self-aware and self-critical about its 
paternalistic ways, and began to take the rights of the patient seri-
ously: patients, it was determined, should be truthfully informed 
about their diagnosis and the nature of available treatments (in-
cluding harms and risks). In a landmark ruling of 1972, the US 
Court of Appeals obligated doctors to communicate medical infor-
mation to the patient in a language that would be readily compre-
hensible. The result is that today medical doctors in the West are 
obliged to be open and honest in medical consultations – in short, 
to respect patient autonomy. The more far-reaching consequence 
is that healthcare professionals are expected to furnish patients 
with adequate information about their disorders and available 
treatments to allow them to reach adequate healthcare decisions. 
While there is still some dispute about whether medical practice 
has completely eschewed the mantle of paternalism [Veatch, 2009; 
Topol, 2015], the ethical norms of truthfulness and respect for pa-
tient autonomy have now become established professional com-
mitments in mainstream medical and healthcare codes of practice.
In this paper, we address a relatively neglected issue [Blease, 
2015a]: Is the current practice of psychotherapy paternalistic? As in 
mainstream medicine, clinical psychotherapy claims to eschew pa-
ternalistic behavior, but we suggest that there is reasonable doubt 
that prospective psychotherapy patients are not afforded the moral 
status of autonomous agents. More than this, we argue, there is 
good reason to believe that patient outcome may be improved if 
ethical standards of adequate informed consent were met.
The paper begins with a definition of paternalism and an explo-
ration of what this means in the healthcare context. Based on this, 
we show that paternalism is explicitly (and widely) eschewed in the 
professional ethics codes of psychotherapy and psychology bodies. 
After establishing the centrality of informed consent to the profes-
sionalism of psychotherapy, we move on to investigate the allega-
tion that ‘psychotherapy is a placebo’. This is a (partly unfounded) 
charge that has repercussions for informed consent procedures. 
However, we argue that the terms ‘placebo’ and ‘placebo effect’ 
have myriad working definitions with current research contexts; 
moreover, we contend that the application of these terms to psy-
chotherapy is fraught with conceptual and empirical difficulties, 
many of which take us beyond the reach of this paper [cf. Gaab et 
al., 2015]. Nonetheless, we argue that the ethical debate about the 
role of placebos in healthcare raises pertinent themes which are ap-
plicable to psychotherapy practice: What standards of disclosure 
are being provided in clinical settings? And might professional 
honesty undermine treatment outcomes? Addressing these ques-
tions is the central focus of this paper. Therefore, in foregrounding 
this discussion, we provide an investigation of what healthcare 
ethicists understand by the concept ‘informed consent’ before ar-
guing that there is broad agreement in psychotherapy research and 
practice about the importance of common factors (e.g., therapist 
effects, the working alliance, and patient expectations) in patient 
outcome for a range of mental disorders. We avoid the controver-
sial debate about the relative significance of specific factors in dif-
ferent versions of psychotherapy [cf. Wampold and Imel, 2015] 
and instead assert that there is a widespread consensus that com-
mon factors are relevant to therapeutic outcome. This brings us to 
the key thesis of the paper: We argue that the omission of disclo-
sure of these factors in the informed consent process violates the 
legal and moral duties of the psychotherapist to respect patient au-
tonomy. Furthermore, contrary to any argument that beneficence 
may be impeded by honesty, we argue that the therapeutic rela-
tionship (and therefore patient outcome) may be enhanced by the 
provision of adequate informed consent [Blease, 2015a;b; Gaab et 
al., 2015; Trachsel et al., 2015].
The Concept of Paternalism
In a historical context, deference to the medical profession was 
assumed to be defensible and indispensable. Undisputedly, doctors 
are obliged to safeguard patients against harm. Until the middle of 
the last century this included the duty to protect patients from self-
harm if they knew too much about their illnesses, or if they were 
privy to information that the doctor judged detrimental to the pa-
tient’s health or wellbeing. Given that beneficence is still construed 
as the ne plus ultra of medical professionalism, how does this 
moral imperative balance with the modern healthcare imperative 
to respect patient autonomy? In order to answer this question, we 
first need to consider the concept of paternalism in more detail.
Paternalism can be defined as, ‘the interference of a state or an 
individual with another person, against their will, and defended or 
motivated by a claim that the person interfered with will be better 
off or protected from harm’ [Dworkin, 2010]. According to this 
definition, paternalism always involves a certain degree of con-
straint on autonomy for particular reasons [Trachsel et al., 2013]. 
Paternalistic behavior may be characterized as weak (soft) or 
strong [Engelhardt Tristam, 1989]. According to weak paternalism, 
‘a man can rightly be prevented from harming himself (when other 
interests are not directly involved) only if his intended action is 
substantially non-voluntary or can be presumed to be so in the ab-
sence of evidence to the contrary’ [Feinberg, 1971]. Strong pater-
nalism means that a person is protected, ‘against his will, from the 
harmful consequences even of his fully voluntary choices and un-
dertakings’ [Feinberg, 1971]; and, ‘whether weakly or strongly pa-
ternalistic, the motivation for potentially justifiable paternalism is 
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usually the prevention of harm (non-maleficence) and/or the ben-
efit to the person whose autonomy is overridden or compromised’ 
[Trachsel et al., 2013]. Since paternalistic actions always involve a 
violation of the moral principle of autonomy, strong reasons need 
to be advanced to justify them [e.g., Silber, 2011].
It should be pointed out that there need not be a conflict be-
tween respect for autonomy and beneficence but where there is a 
perceived tension, arguments for paternalism must first invoke the 
notion that the ethical imperative of beneficence clashes in a mor-
ally significant way with respect for patient autonomy; second, the 
case must be made that the right to self-determination could be 
seen as (in some particular circumstance) of lower moral value 
than beneficence. In summary, the structure of such moral con-
flicts entails that – independent of the final decision made – one of 
these two moral principles of healthcare ethics is overridden [Beau-
champ and Childress, 2009]. 
First, however, it is important to examine the ethical codes of 
conduct of professional psychotherapists. 
Paternalism Is Eschewed in Ethical Codes of  
Practice and Informed Consent
In Germany, psychotherapy is practiced by specialist physicians 
for psychiatry, psychosomatics, and psychotherapy or by specialist 
psychologists for psychotherapy by law. The ethical code of prac-
tice by the German Federal Chamber of Psychotherapists entails an 
article on informed consent (§7). It states that before the initiation 
of a psychotherapeutic treatment the patient needs to be provided 
with the following timely information enabling her or him to give 
well-considered informed consent: information on psychotherapy 
type, scope, procedure, expected effects, the risks as well as its ne-
cessity, urgency, and prospects for successful outcome. Other fac-
tors, such as session duration, frequency, and estimated total time 
of the treatment, should also be discussed.
Similar rules are stated in the Ethical Principles of the German 
Psychological Society (DGP), in the Association of German Profes-
sional Psychologists (BDP), and in the Code of Conduct of the As-
sociation of German Professional Psychologists: 
‘Psychologists must inform their clients/patients about all key 
measures taken and the course of treatment provided and must en-
sure that they have obtained such persons’ consent. If therapeutic 
treatment is provided, psychologists must draw individuals’ atten-
tion to the risks involved and the alternative treatments available. 
This duty to inform also encompasses issues relating to fees and 
the reimbursement of costs.’ (D.I.2.)
In Switzerland the code of conduct of the Federation of Swiss 
Psychologists reads as follows: 
‘Members shall sufficiently explain, comprehensibly and realis-
tically, to their patients or their legal representatives in particular: 
a) the planned procedure or methods and the setting, b) any risks 
involved in the treatment and alternative treatments, c) the finan-
cial conditions, namely the fee or payments from the basic or ad-
ditional voluntary insurance, and how missed sessions will be in-
voiced, d) professional secrecy. […] They shall in particular clarify 
with patients the intended goals and the estimated duration of the 
treatment. […] Members shall mention if they are working for a 
doctor on a delegated basis.’
Meanwhile, in the USA, the American Psychological Associa-
tion (APA) specifies that psychologists should ‘[o]btain the in-
formed consent of the individual’ (3.10, [APA, 2010]) and ‘Psy-
chologists should seek to promote accuracy, honesty, and truthful-
ness in the science, teaching, and practice of psychology.’ Similarly, 
the Ethical Framework for Good Practice of the British Association 
for Counseling and Psychotherapy (BACP) states that practitioners 
should, ‘ensure accuracy in any advertising or information given in 
advance of services offered; seek freely given and adequately in-
formed consent… The principle of autonomy opposes the manipu-
lation of clients against their will, even for beneficial social ends’ 
[BACP, 2013]. 
In the USA and UK where psychotherapy is practiced by li-
censed doctors (usually psychiatrists), they must obtain the ‘con-
sent or other valid authority’ of the patient (UK) [GMC, 2010] and 
are under strict guidance that ‘withholding medical information 
from patients is … ethically unacceptable’ [AMA, 2006]. 
Thus, when it comes to respect for patient autonomy in clinical 
practice professional organizations are consistent in their norma-
tive guidelines: practitioners are expected to be honest and have a 
duty to provide adequate information to patients. Respect for pa-
tient autonomy trumps the ethical imperative of beneficence: 
healthcare ethics codes oppose paternalism and uphold the princi-
ple of respect for autonomy. In short, in order to act beneficently, 
practitioners must first obtain permission to do so.
In respect of the specific content of informed consent guidelines 
in psychotherapy, what ought to be conveyed to patients? Before 
we examine classical bioethical considerations on the standards of 
disclosure, it is worth highlighting what psychotherapy guidelines 
advise. In the USA, a report conducted on behalf of APA by the 
National Register of Health Service Psychologists [Fisher and Or-
ansky, 2008a] states that:
‘[D]epending on their treatment modality psychologists should 
provide clients with information about the overall approach they 
will use to treat the presenting problem, and likely techniques that 
the approach may entail e.g., exposure therapy, dream analysis, de-
tailed developmental history, conjoint family sessions, behaviour 
contracts, or any other information relevant to making an in-
formed decision to engage in treatment’.
The report adds that, ‘In addition, some therapists choose to in-
form clients of the empirical evidence guiding their treatment 
choice’. The addendum suggests that providing evidence for the ef-
fectiveness of a treatment modality (whether it is a version of psy-
chodynamic therapy, cognitive behavioral therapy, etc) is not nec-
essary for informed consent: What matters is that the therapist 
discloses the nature of the treatment (e.g., whether it involves the 
techniques of cognitive therapy, exposure, or tracking family his-
tory, etc). Indeed, at this juncture it should be noted that the sug-
gestion that evidence might (or might not) be provided to patients 
seems to indicate some equivocation over whether or not forms of 
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treatment ought to be evidence-based. On a charitable reading it 
might be assumed that all treatments being offered to patients are 
evidence-based and that the therapist has an option to inform pa-
tients about the treatment that they would like to use, with the pa-
tient and the evidence supporting this decision.
The BACP in the UK advocates similar advice in its ethical code 
of conduct: 
‘All practitioners are encouraged to share their professional 
knowledge and practice for the benefit for their clients and to pro-
mote awareness of counseling and psychotherapy in the public 
through providing information and education’. 
The guidelines continue: 
‘All training in counseling and psychotherapy should model 
standards and practice consistent with those expected of practi-
tioners in the role for which training is being provided’ [BACP, 
2013]. 
This latter statement suggests that good practice involves disclo-
sure of information about the specific treatment that the therapist 
practices; just as in US guidelines, this involves taking the validity 
of psychotherapy theories at face value. 
In Summary
Disclosure, according to professional ethics codes of psychology 
and psychotherapy organizations, is disclosure about the tech-
niques in which the practitioner has been trained and has the nec-
essary skills that need to be applied. Whether such disclosure oc-
curs in practice is another matter [see e.g., Dsubanko-Obermayr 
and Baumann, 2010]. In addition, there also appears to be an op-
tional stipulation that therapists may decide whether to provide 
supporting evidence for their treatment choice. Before we address 
the content and particulars of information disclosure in psycho-
therapy in the next section, we discuss an issue of particular rele-
vance to informed consent to psychotherapy: The question of the 
relationship between psychotherapy and placebo.
The Content of Disclosure: Psychotherapy and the 
Placebo 
Hypothesis
In scientific literature, there is a growing body of empirical re-
search as well as a lively discussion about the mechanisms of 
change in different forms of psychotherapy. Almost from the in-
ception of talking therapies until the present day, the charge that 
talking cures are ‘pseudo-scientific’, ‘sham’, or ‘placebos’ have also 
been leveled at psychotherapy [Rosenzweig, 1936; Rosenthal and 
Frank, 1956; Frank 1991]. This charge is significant not just to the 
empirical evaluation of the effectiveness of psychotherapy – today, 
psychotherapy is clearly very effective for various forms of mental 
disorders [Lambert, 2013] – but to our present concern, namely its 
ethical status. 
In order to appraise the claim that ‘psychotherapy is a placebo’ 
and the repercussions of this for informed consent it would first be 
necessary to arrive at satisfactory definitions of ‘placebo’ and ‘pla-
cebo effect’. We argue that there are wide-ranging conceptions of 
‘placebo’ and ‘placebo effect’, and we contend that non-controver-
sial definitions neither exist nor (therefore) can easily be applied to 
psychotherapy. In this section we suggest that many present defini-
tional confusions in relation to the terms ‘placebo’ and ‘placebo ef-
fect’ amount to what Turner describes as ‘lumping a disparate 
range of elements together’ which is ‘in essence, like mixing paint 
colors to get brown’ [Turner, 2012]. 
Placebos are often conceived as ‘inert substances’ but recent 
empirical research complicates matters because placebos (de-
fined as fake treatments) are not necessary to elicit the placebo 
effect since verbal and non-verbal socio-emotional cues of practi-
tioners are also hypothesized to trigger the placebo effect [Kap-
tchuk et al, 2008; Jensen et al., 2012]. This has led some to define 
placebos as ‘context effects’ – ‘effects deriving from patient-prac-
titioner relationships’ [Di Blasi and Harkness, 2001]. In turn, this 
definition has been criticized because it overlooks other inciden-
tal features of verum treatments (e.g., branding, modality, expen-
siveness, the manner in which the treatment is administered by a 
practitioner), which also influence the size of the placebo effect 
[Kaptchuk et al., 2000]. Indeed, if we were to define the placebo 
effect as ‘practitioner effect’ as Di Blasi and colleagues propose 
[2001] and as Kirsch has pointed out [Kirsch, 2005], this results 
in a default or a priori definition of psychotherapy just as a 
placebo. 
Others have attempted to circumvent these contextual problems 
by claiming that placebos are non-specific care effects and that it is 
the specificity of a treatment that determines whether it is a place-
bo: In this way, Shapiro and Shapiro [1997] propose, ‘[The placebo 
effect] is primarily the nonspecific psychological or psychophysio-
logical therapeutic effect produced by a placebo...’. To de-mystify 
the placebo concept and open the door to further research on its 
components and mechanisms, Castonguay and grosse Holtforth 
[2005] have gone further by proposing that the term refers to ‘not-
yet-specified’ effects. Finally, Grünbaum [1981; 1986] has argued 
that placebos are treatments whose ‘characteristic features’ are not 
remedial for the target condition under scrutiny. In light of the 
afore-mentioned empirical research, these definitions are problem-
atic because they conjugate placebo(s) and placebo effect(s); they 
problematically assume that the terms are ‘moveable categories’ 
since the definitions are relativized to particular therapeutic theo-
ries [Greenwood, 1997]. 
Amidst this panoply of theoretical definitions of placebos and 
the placebo effect in biomedical contexts, the job of translating 
these terms to psychotherapy has proven even more challenging. 
Take the idea of comparing psychotherapy to a so-called placebo 
treatment in randomized controlled trials: Psychotherapeutic treat-
ments are sometimes compared to ‘attention placebo control 
groups’ (which are often labeled as the ‘placebo’). These so-called 
placebos are typically interpreted as treatments that match the 
amount of time and attention as the verum treatment under evalu-
ation. The key problem is that it ignores the epistemological con-
cern that controls ought to mimic every aspect of a treatment ex-
cept for the specific ingredient under scrutiny [cf. Howick, 2011; 
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Turner, 2012]. In biomedical contexts this is a (relatively) easier 
task compared with psychotherapy clinical trials, since decompos-
ing the specific ingredients in psychotherapy is a much more mul-
tifaceted and complicated endeavor. In addition to the difficulties 
in conceptually and procedurally separating a ‘true’ intervention 
from a so-called placebo condition, also a key standard for mini-
mizing experimental biases, i.e. double blinding, is impossible in 
psychotherapy research, simply because therapists will always 
know what they are doing. 
Additional problems arise in psychotherapy where placebos 
(and placebo effects) are conflated with the factors that are consid-
ered to be common to different forms of psychotherapy. For exam-
ple, it has been argued that the following common factors can be 
labeled placebos on the grounds that they constitute non-specific 
or not-yet-specified components of treatment: the therapeutic alli-
ance, therapist factors (such as positive regard, empathy, trustwor-
thiness), the expectation that the treatment will be effective (on the 
part of patients and therapists), the provision of explanations for 
patients’ problems [Frank and Frank, 1991; Jopling, 2008]. 
Finally, some scholars have gone so far as to contend that the 
placebo concept does not make any sense in the context of 
psychotherapy:
‘[t]he placebo effect in medicine is produced by factors other 
than the physical properties of the treatment. However, the effect 
of psychotherapy is – by definition of the term psychotherapy – 
produced by something other than the physical properties of the 
treatment. Therefore, using the medical definition of placebo, the 
effects of psychotherapy are ipso facto placebo effects, and psy-
chotherapy is ipso facto a placebo’ [Kirsch et al., 2015; Kirsch, 
2005].
We argue that this reductio ad absurdum confuses ontological 
concerns (the issue about what placebos and the placebo effect 
might be) with epistemological issues (the use of placebo controls 
in clinical trials as a means of evaluating treatment efficacy). 
Thus, while we contend that there may yet be utility in ap-
praising experimental and clinical ethics using also a placebo 
framework, we submit that deployment of these terms in our cur-
rent ethical evaluation of psychotherapy takes us beyond the 
scope of this contribution [Gaab et al., 2015]. Nonetheless, we do 
identify a common underlying intuition in both the conceptual-
ization and ethical analysis of placebos that we take to be a central 
concern of this paper. This is the idea that the use of clinical pla-
cebos, in some way, implies an omission of the disclosure by the 
clinician of central, therapeutic components of treatment, and 
that equating psychotherapy to placebos involves the misrepre-
sentation (perhaps on the grounds of beneficence) of fundamen-
tal features of treatment [Blease, 2015c]. Therefore, we concen-
trate on the latter, tangible notion – that psychotherapy may in-
volve omissions of relevant material disclosure to patients. In the 
next sections we focus on evidence that psychotherapists may, in 
some non-trivial way, be engaging in routine failures of disclosure 
to patients. Before we turn to this issue, however, it is necessary to 
say more about the ethical standard that any disclosure should 
meet.
Motivating a Standard for Informed Consent in  
Psychotherapy
In part due to inherent time constraints, we cannot expect the 
therapist exhaustively to disclose all treatment-relevant informa-
tion to prospective patients. Therefore in clinical practice, in-
formed consent must be restricted to those fundamental aspects of 
the treatment that enable the patients to consent (or dissent) to a 
treatment [Beauchamp and Childress, 2009, p. 117]. The classical 
biomedical understanding of informed consent is owed to Beau-
champ and Childress who decompose it into three main compo-
nents: (1) threshold or preconditions for informed consent to 
occur; (2) information elements; and (3) consent elements. How 
might these components map onto psychotherapy?
Take the first set of criteria – the preconditions for consent. Psy-
chotherapists deal with individuals suffering from a wide range of 
mental health conditions and problems. However, strong argu-
ments must be made if therapists are to presume incapacity to con-
sent on such grounds. It is important to emphasize that even in 
cases where mental-health specialists determine that an individu-
al’s mental functioning is impaired, this does not entail that the in-
dividual lacks the ability to make informed decisions about his or 
her treatment. Indeed, the UK’s Mental Capacity Act of 2005 [UK 
Department for Constitutional Affairs, 2005] states that there must 
not only be a presumption of capacity to make treatment decisions 
but the burden is on health professionals to take steps to show that 
a patient lacks any such capacity: 
‘[T]he Act’s first key principle is that people must be assumed to 
have capacity to make a decision or act for themselves unless it is 
established that they lack it. That means that working out a per-
son’s best interests is only relevant when that person has been as-
sessed as lacking, or is reasonably believed to lack capacity to make 
the decision in question or give consent to an act being done.’  
Presumably, then, in order to avail of the kind of dialogue and 
exchanges involved in different psychotherapy modalities, patients 
must demonstrate an ability to engage in substantive discussion 
and reflection, commit to regular treatment appointments, and un-
dertake homework. In addition, many patients may exhibit sub-
threshold symptoms for mental disorders. Therefore, in this paper 
we assume that adult patients have both the capacity to understand 
information provided in psychotherapy disclosures, and thus ex-
hibit voluntariness in reaching decisions on that basis.
Several heuristics have traditionally been employed to deter-
mine the content and extent of such information elements. Beau-
champ and Childress [2009, p 122] identify three ‘competing’ 
measures of disclosure that have helped to direct normative stand-
ards: The professional practice standard, the reasonable person 
standard, and the subjective standard. 
The professional practice standard is the view that ‘professional 
custom establishes the amount and kinds of information to be dis-
closed’. On this view, healthcare practitioners should proceed at 
their own discretion and as tradition dictates. This normative 
standard was customary in healthcare contexts until paternalism 
was explicitly eschewed by medical ethics codes. The second meas-
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ure of disclosure described by Beauchamp and Childress – the rea-
sonable person standard – promotes the heuristic that practitioners 
should disclose the kinds of information that a reasonable person 
would require in a hypothetical treatment situation. Thus, this nor-
mative standard works backwards from a conception of ‘the rea-
sonable patient’ to speculate about the kinds of information that 
patients would desire to know about their treatment options. Fi-
nally, Beauchamp and Childress propose the subjective standard 
which they describe as the provision of information with reference 
to the unique requirements of the patient: ‘Persons may have un-
conventional beliefs, unusual health problems, or unique family 
histories that require a different informational base than the rea-
sonable person needs’ [Beauchamp and Childress, 2009, p. 123].
How do these different heuristics compare? Consider the first 
one, the notional assumption that doctors (or other health profes-
sionals) have the expertise to discern patient preferences in regard 
to treatment options. On empirical grounds, this claim is unsub-
stantiated: Evidence shows that doctors are poor judges of patient 
preferences [e.g. Street and Haidet, 2011]. But perhaps more im-
portantly, as Beauchamp and Childress [2009, p. 122] assert, ‘the 
professional practice standard subverts the right of autonomous 
choice’. Therefore, even if healthcare professionals somehow intu-
ited or knew patients’ preferences for treatments, satisfying their 
preferences would not be the same thing as respecting patients’ 
treatment choice [Barnhill and Miller, 2015]. Thus, dependence on 
the paternalistic heuristic that health professionals can (and 
should) make decisions on behalf of patients is profoundly prob-
lematic both on moral and empirical grounds.
Regarding the second heuristic, the reasonable person standard, 
Beauchamp and Childress [2009, p. 123] argue that there are prac-
tical problems in envisaging what material information a reasona-
ble person may require – that the conceptualization is much too 
abstract to be workable. While there are problems related to the 
feasibility of healthcare practitioners reliably conceiving of ‘ideal-
ized rational patients’ (including whether such patients even exist), 
we believe that the core sentiment behind this standard is defensi-
ble, i.e. it is likely that there is empirically determined treatment-
specific information that patients may routinely require in order to 
reach informed decisions about treatments. The case may be made 
that heuristics should not be deployed but, instead, specific guide-
lines with respect to disclosure practices should explicitly be incor-
porated into disclosures for both therapists and patients. 
In this way, the ‘subjective person standard’ is likely to play an 
important role in disclosure practices. Indeed, Beauchamp and 
Childress [2009, p.124] contend that this third heuristic is ‘the 
preferable moral standard of disclosure, because it alone meets 
 persons’ informational needs.’ They concede, however, that in 
practice dependence on this standard is too demanding: ‘We can-
not reasonably expect a doctor to do an exhaustive background 
and character analysis of each patient to determine the relevant 
 information’. 
Certainly, we argue that some admixture of reasonable person 
and subjective standards must inform disclosure practices. But we 
go further and argue that patient standards should not be the only 
influence on informational disclosure: This is because patients are 
not experts in deciding whether information is trivial or funda-
mental for making the best possible decision [Blease, 2015c]. For 
example, studies show that how patients conceptualize their disor-
der (e.g. depression) can negatively influence their long-term 
healthcare behavior [Blease, 2014]. This conceptualization may 
strongly depend on what information they are provided with by 
their therapists. Furthermore, there is considerable evidence from 
healthcare psychology that how information is provided to patients 
influences decision-making as well as relief of symptoms [Gigeren-
zer, 2007; Alfano, 2015; Blease, 2015c]. Therefore, it is not just the 
content of disclosures that may influence patients’ health decisions 
(including information that patients may incorrectly deem irrele-
vant to their choices), but also how that information is disclosed 
that may be germane to adequate disclosure. 
While it is impossible to provide a full a priori prescriptive list 
of material information that helps an individual to consent or re-
fuse to treatment, certain key factors will be relevant to disclosure. 
These will include information about diagnostic findings, the dis-
order itself (psychopathology), the (differential) indication for the 
treatment, and characteristics of the proposed treatment such as 
aims/goals, expected procedures and course, expected benefits and 
risks, and expected duration of the therapy. In addition, how such 
disclosure is provided to patients must be balanced against benefi-
cence (the potential to improve patient outcome), and this should 
be factored into any appraisal of informed consent to 
psychotherapy.
Does Psychotherapy Uphold Its Own Ethical  
Principles?
Given the foregoing discussion, is there evidence that psycho-
therapists routinely fail to provide adequate informed consent to 
psychotherapy patients? While it is difficult to ascertain (in clinical 
practice) what therapists are disclosing to patients, we contend that 
there are good reasons to believe that patient autonomy is not 
being fully respected and that therapists are not completely fulfill-
ing their own ethical standards. In light of the empirical evidence 
into the effectiveness of psychotherapy we argue that therapists 
may be omitting fundamental information about the mechanisms 
of change of psychotherapy.
It should be noted that the very concept of evidence-based prac-
tice (EBP) is still divisive especially among adherents of psychoana-
lytical psychotherapy who argue that the use of measurements is 
both seriously limited and unnecessary [Tanenbaum, 2003]. How-
ever, it has been increasingly argued that evidence-based research 
is of the utmost relevance to the clinical practice of psychotherapy 
[e.g. Wampold and Imel, 2015], yet surprisingly little has been said 
about how these research findings might ethically be conveyed to 
patients. Moreover, even among the majority of psychologists who 
accept the importance of an evidence-based approach to psycho-
therapy there is still controversy over how to define this research 
agendum. APA defines EBP as ‘the integration of the best available 
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research with clinical expertise in the context of patient character-
istics, culture, and preferences’ [APA Presidential Task Force on 
Evidence-Based Practice, 2006]. This suggests a thick concept of 
evidence – namely, the integration of ‘scientific results related to 
intervention strategies, assessment, clinical problems, and patient 
populations in laboratory and field settings as well as to clinically 
relevant results of basic research in psychology and related fields’ 
[APA Presidential Task Force on Evidence-Based Practice, 2006]. 
In addition, however, the more commonly deployed notion is the 
narrower conception of Research-Supported Psychological Treat-
ments. This conception refers to a narrow medical model of evi-
dence, deploys a similar framework as the US Food and Drug Ad-
ministration’s drug criteria, and focuses primarily on clinical trials 
which compare (and purport to show) the differences among vari-
ous treatments for different psychopathologies [Wampold and 
Imel, 2015, p. 27; Goldfried, 2013]. For example, the BACP’s web-
site provides a repository of links to psychotherapy research which 
primarily lists those studies aimed at investigating the absolute ef-
ficacy of therapy and the effectiveness of specific therapies for par-
ticular conditions, rather than research aimed at investigating the 
relative efficacy of common factors within psychotherapy [BACP, 
2015]. Similarly, the webpage of APA’s Society for Clinical Psy-
chology provides a comprehensive list of ‘Research-Supported Psy-
chological Treatments’ for specific disorders: again, these studies 
do not survey meta-theoretical research aimed at assessing the 
comparative effectiveness of different versions of psychotherapy or 
research aimed at de-compositional analysis of common factors 
[APA, 2015]. 
It is how one interprets ‘evidence’ that matters. For example, 
and perhaps most prominently, Wampold et al. [1997; Wampold 
and Imel, 2015] have argued that evidence shows that the specific 
techniques involved in different versions of psychotherapy (e.g., 
cognitive restructuring in cognitive behavioral therapy, or access-
ing repressed memories in versions of Freudian psychoanalysis) 
are irrelevant to outcome and account for less than 1% of the ef-
fectiveness of therapy. Others have disputed this interpretation, 
arguing for the therapeutic significance of specific techniques [e.g. 
Lambert and Barley, 2002]; indeed Marcus et al. [2014] confirmed 
the findings of Wampold et al. [1997]. 
In this paper we avoid engagement in this important debate; in-
stead we highlight the shared (non-controversial) consensus that 
there are common factors in therapy which are significant and rel-
evant to patient outcome. These factors include the therapeutic al-
liance, goal consensus between therapist and patient, therapist fac-
tors (positive regard, empathy and genuineness) as well as patient 
factors (the expectation that the treatment will be effective). While 
there remains scholarly disagreement over the size of the therapeu-
tic effectiveness of each of these common factors in therapy, it 
seems reasonable to state that there is professional and scholarly 
agreement as well as empirical support for these factors playing a 
major role in therapeutic change [e.g. Beck, 1995; Lambert and 
Barley 2002; Norcross, 2011; Wampold and Imel, 2015]. 
Against the ongoing debate about empirical evidence in psycho-
therapy we suggest that there is room for improvement in regard to 
two features of informed consent. First, we argue that therapists 
may currently be failing to provide sufficiently tailored disclosure 
to patients: we suggest that therapists may be failing to describe the 
specific techniques involved in different versions of psychotherapy, 
regardless of the empirical status of these techniques. This is an ar-
gument that has been made elsewhere:
‘[T]he content of an informed consent statement may be quite 
different for more insight-oriented psychotherapy than for a more 
symptom-focused treatment. Symptom-focused psychotherapies, 
such as exposure treatment for specific phobias, primarily aim to 
reduce the symptoms of the disorder, while the main focus of in-
sight-oriented psychotherapies is to achieve a new understanding 
of oneself and one’s relationships with others. Accordingly, in a 
symptom-focused psychotherapy, goals, risks, and procedures are 
more concretely nameable beforehand, whereas the goals of an in-
sight-oriented psychotherapy need to be more openly formulated. 
Consequently, due to the less foreseeable course of an insight-ori-
ented therapy a more complex and contingent IC [informed con-
sent] may be required at intake, whereas a more straightforward IC 
may be pursued for symptom-focused psychotherapy that more 
closely resembles ICs for pharmacological treatment.’ [Trachsel et 
al, 2015].
For example, a survey on informed consent among practicing 
psychotherapists in the USA revealed similarity and variability be-
tween individuals as well as between adherents of theoretic ap-
proaches in beliefs and practices regarding confidentiality, risks, 
treatment length, treatment procedures, and alternatives [Somberg 
et al, 1993]. In particular, psychodynamic therapists seem to voice 
skepticism regarding the value and feasibility of informed consent 
in therapeutic practice [Goddard et al, 2008]. We contend that fur-
nishing patients with proper information about the techniques in-
volved in therapy sessions has the potential to demystify and there-
by reduce the fear of psychotherapy [Fisher and Oransky, 2008b; 
Boswell et al, 2015]. 
Second (but arguably an even more substantive and pressing 
issue) is the importance of disclosing information about funda-
mental non-specific/not-yet-specified or common therapeutic fac-
tors in therapy. In light of the broad consensus in the empirical re-
search that certain common factors in therapy are relevant to out-
come and given the foregoing discussion on minimal standards of 
adequate disclosure, we argue that these factors should be commu-
nicated to patients in an understandable manner [Blease, 2015a,b; 
Gaab et al., 2015]. In summary, if patient autonomy is to be re-
spected, the following information should be conveyed to patients: 
(i) agreement about the goals and tasks of therapy is relevant to 
successful outcome; (ii) the alliance with the therapist is important 
for good psychotherapy processes and outcomes and patients 
should feel supported, encouraged and understood; and (iii) pa-
tients should be aware that their own attitude and expectations 
about therapy are also fundamentally relevant to the success of 
therapy [Blease, 2015b]. 
What might this mean in practice? Take the example of cogni-
tive behavioral therapy (CBT) – it has recently been argued that, 
‘[i]t is not sufficient to say, “CBT works because of cognitive re-
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structuring techniques aimed at changing unhelpful or faulty cog-
nition”; rather, truthful disclosure would involve: “CBT uses tech-
niques based on a theory about cognitive restructuring. But the evi-
dence shows that it works best for those patients who can readily 
commit to the theory and techniques behind the treatment.”’ 
[Blease, 2015b]
Therapists should inform the patient that if they feel unable to 
commit to the therapy or the sessions it may be that another ver-
sion of psychotherapy would be more appropriate. In addition, we 
propose that therapist factors (such as empathy, genuineness, and 
positive regard) and factors relating to the therapeutic alliance 
might be relayed to potential patients in the following manner: 
‘During these sessions you should feel supported by me and en-
couraged to discuss your problems. If, for any reason, you feel un-
comfortable about the progress we are making, please feel able to 
discuss this with me or with your doctor. We will try to work 
through these issues but it may also be that another therapist or 
another version of therapy would work better for you. This does 
not mean therapy has failed or that we cannot find a more appro-
priate treatment or therapist for your needs’. While such disclo-
sures may seem unorthodox, or may discomfit the practitioner, 
these are not sufficient reasons to preclude raising such fundamen-
tally important information. As a complementary measure we also 
suggest that third-party mechanisms may be an important method 
of communicating this information to patients and keeping track 
of patient progress without terminating therapy prematurely: e.g., 
Lambert [2007] has successfully pioneered a patient tracking sys-
tem which showed that ‘integrating treatment response research 
into routine mental health care reliably improved positive out-
comes and reduced negative outcomes’ [see also Lutz et al., 2011]. 
In summary, we argue that there is no evidence to support the 
view that adequate disclosure policies would undermine the effec-
tiveness of psychotherapy. Rather, we assert that the opposite is 
likely to be the case; and while we acknowledge that this is an em-
pirical matter and one to be determined by ongoing research, we 
contend that thus far the evidence supports the view that there is 
more to be gained from patients being treated as autonomous 
agents, privy to augmented understanding of the mechanisms of 
change of psychotherapy rather than being treated as passive re-
cipients of paternalistic care.
Conclusion
Informed consent is not only a moral duty it has various advan-
tages for the patient. In this paper we acknowledge that there are 
still outstanding issues about how to interpret evidence within psy-
chotherapy. However, we urge that appropriate informed consent 
procedures are important for augmenting mutual trust, and thus, 
are the basis for a strong therapeutic relationship that is one of the 
most important factors for good psychotherapy outcomes [e.g., 
Lambert and Barley, 2002]. It has been argued that informed con-
sent may also prevent undue harm or dropout rates among 
patients:
‘It may be, for example, that if there is lack of progress patients 
erroneously blame themselves for the failure of… [therapy] to 
work. If as a consequence they drop out of therapy the outcome 
may be clinically harmful and it may negatively affect patients’ fu-
ture trust in therapy, therapists, and even referring doctors.’ 
[Blease, 2015b].
Further, informed consent in psychotherapy – just as is stand-
ard in other healthcare contexts – should meet the challenge of 
how best to inform patients about potential risks and harms of psy-
chological treatments [Lilienfeld, 2007; Ladwig et al, 2014]: this is 
still not standard practice in psychotherapy. Finally, adequate dis-
closure serves the empowerment of patients: ‘Informed consent 
procedures emphasize the patient’s role in making treatment deci-
sions, increasing a sense of ownership over the process’ [Fisher and 
Oransky, 2008b, p. 576; Beahrs and Gutheil, 2001], and to date re-
search shows that this improves psychotherapy outcome [e.g., 
Pope and Vasquez, 2007; Lambert, 2007; Lutz et al., 2011]. The 
broad goal of this paper is to remind psychotherapists of their legal 
and ethical obligations in maintaining their own stated standards 
of informed consent. It is the modest conclusion of this contribu-
tion that these goals can be met with reasonable and unobtrusive 
modifications to current practices.
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